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A Preliminary First Amendment 
Analysis of Legislation Treating  
News Aggregation as  
Copyright Infringement 
Alfred C. Yen* 
ABSTRACT 
The newspaper industry has recently experienced economic 
difficulty.  Profits have declined because fewer people read printed 
versions of newspapers, preferring instead to get their news through so-
called “news aggregators” who compile newspaper headlines and 
provide links to storied posted on newspaper websites.  This harms 
newspaper revenue because news aggregators collect advertising 
revenue that newspapers used to enjoy. 
Some have responded to this problem by advocating the use of 
copyright to give newspapers the ability to control the use of their 
stories and headlines by news aggregators.  This proposal is 
controversial, for news aggregators often do not commit copyright 
infringement.  Accordingly, the use of copyright to help the newspaper 
industry would likely require amendment of the existing statute. 
This Article analyzes the constitutionality of such potential 
legislation under the First Amendment.  As the Article will show, 
legislation that treats news aggregation as copyright infringement 
changes the traditional contours of copyright in ways that expose 
copyright to serious First Amendment scrutiny.  This analysis will 
show that Congress does not have a completely free hand in choosing 
how, if at all, to help the newspaper industry.  In fact, Congress must 
be careful not to unduly restrict the practice of news aggregation. 
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This Article applies the First Amendment to potential 
copyright legislation giving newspapers1 the ability to control news 
aggregation.2  Such legislation (referred to as “aggregation control 
legislation”) potentially maintains or restores the profitability of news 
organizations that have lost revenue as technology renders old 
business models obsolete.  Applying the First Amendment to such 
legislation shows that, while Congress may assist a struggling news 
industry, Congress must act with care to avoid suppressing the free 
speech rights of news aggregators more than is reasonably necessary 
to accomplish its legislative goal. 
One need not go far to find stories about the declining 
profitability of newspapers.3  Many have closed,4 leaving questions 
about the future of news itself and the possible effects of that absence 
on society.  If newspapers cannot make enough money reporting the 
news, then newsgathering itself could disappear, leaving the public 
 
 1. This Article uses the term “newspapers” to denote traditional print newspapers and 
others who produce original news stories and distribute them as text in print or electronic form. 
These other entities include institutions like the Associated Press and, in some cases, radio and 
television broadcasters. 
 2. For a description of news aggregation, see infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
 3. See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, The Accelerating Decline of Newspapers, WASH. POST, Oct. 
27, 2009, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/ 
AR2009102603272.html; Tim Arango, Fall in Newspaper Sales Accelerates to Pass 7%, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/business/media/ 
28paper.html; James Surowiecki, News You Can Lose, NEW YORKER, Dec. 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/12/22/081222ta_talk_surowiecki. 
 4. See, e.g., Lynn DeBruin & Lisa Ryckman, Rocky Mountain News to Close, Publish 
Final Edition Friday, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 26, 2009, 
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/pages/special-reports/rocky-sale/ (announcing closure 
of the Rocky Mountain News); Dan Richman & Andrea James, Seattle P-I to Publish Last 
Edition Tuesday, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.seattlepi.com/ 
business/403793_piclosure17.html (announcing last print edition of the Seattle Post-
Intelligencer); see also Newspaper Death Watch, http://www.newspaperdeathwatch.com/ (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2010) (listing metropolitan daily newspapers that have closed since March 2007). 
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without information crucial to everyday life and the democratic 
process. 
Although various explanations for the decline of newspapers 
exist, many commentators—including those who run newspapers—
blame news aggregators5 that make unauthorized use of news 
headlines and lead sentences and, as a result, disrupt traditional 
newspaper business models.6  Newspaper profits have not 
traditionally depended on the straight sale of news content.  Instead, 
newspapers have charged readers a nominal fee for single copies of 
newspapers and made the bulk of their money from selling 
advertisements that readers would presumably see.7  The Internet 
changed the newspaper business by making it possible to distribute 
news more quickly and inexpensively than news sources could through 
print copies.  Newspapers responded by putting their content online, 
hoping to attract wider readership and, by extension, more eyeballs 
for which to sell advertisements.8 
Unfortunately for newspapers, placing content online has not 
maintained advertising revenue, for the Internet also made it easy for 
those who did not author news content to deliver and profit from the 
news.  Now, news aggregators can analyze multiple newspaper 
websites, decide which stories will interest readers, and display 
information about those stories to readers—generally the headline 
 
 5. Examples of news aggregators include Digg, http://digg.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 
2010); Google News, http://news.google.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010); Newser, 
http://www.newser.com/ (last visited Apr. 2010); Reddit, http://www.reddit.com/ (last visited Apr. 
2, 2010); Yahoo! News, http://news.yahoo.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
 6. See Nancy Herther, AP Challenges Google and Other News Aggregators at 
Newspaper Conference, INFORMATION TODAY, Apr. 13, 2009, http://newsbreaks.infotoday.com/ 
NewsBreaks/AP-Challenges-Google-and-Other-News-Aggregators-at-Newspaper-Conference-
53423.asp (reporting that Associated Press Chairman Dean Singleton was “mad as hell” over 
damage caused by news aggregators); Arnon Mishkin, The Fallacy of the Link Economy, 
PAIDCONTENT.ORG, Aug. 13, 2009, http://paidcontent.org/article/419-the-fallacy-of-the-link-
economy/ (noting that news executives blame news aggregators for harming newspapers); David 
Sarno, Murdoch accuses Google of news “theft”, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at B1, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/02/business/la-fi-news-google2-2009dec02 (reporting that 
Rupert Murdoch accused news aggregators of theft). 
 7. See John Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm‟n, “Creative Destruction” or Just 
“Destruction”: How Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age? 4 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/091201newsmedia.pdf (stating that newspapers 
traditionally received 80 percent of their revenue from advertising); Posting of Nicholas Carr 
(The Great Unbundling: Newspapers & the Net) to Encyclopædia Britannica Blog, 
http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2008/04/the-great-unbundling-newspapers-the-net/ (Apr. 7, 
2008) (describing importance of advertising revenue to traditional print newspapers). 
 8. See Leibowitz, supra note 7, at 4-6 (describing challenges to journalism and news 
gathering posed by the Internet); Carr, supra note 7 (describing changes in news resulting from 
influence of the Internet, including challenges that arise as newspapers place content online). 
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and a sentence or two from the beginning of the article—along with 
links to the full story.9  Aggregators perform this task in different 
ways.  Some use an entirely automated process, while others use 
human editorial choice or a combination of the two.10  For purposes of 
this Article, however, the salient feature of news aggregation is its 
ability to provide a news vehicle that readers prefer to a single 
newspaper website.  Newspapers therefore face declining revenue 
because fewer readers actually read physical newspapers or browse 
through newspaper websites.  Instead, readers prefer to surf the 
Internet, visiting news aggregators and clicking only on those stories 
that readers care to see in full.11  Doing this eventually takes readers 
to newspaper websites, but newspaper profits are lost because the 
reader does not browse the newspaper‟s entire website.  The reader 
instead views only particular articles of interest and returns to the 
aggregator‟s site, thereby eliminating opportunities to see further 
pages—and the ads they contain—on the newspaper‟s website. Rather, 
the reader sees more ads displayed by the aggregator, who profits 
from selling them.12  Newspapers object to this because they believe 
 
 9. For examples of aggregators, see supra note 5. 
 10. See About Digg, http://about.digg.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (describing how 
Digg uses community submission and community expressed interest to choose and rank 
aggregated stories); About Google News, http://news.google.com/intl/en_us/about_google_ 
news.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (explaining Google News‟s automated process); Posting of 
Josh Catone (5 News Aggregation Methods Compared) to ReadWriteWeb, 
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/news_aggregation_methods.php (July 10, 2007, 12:54 
EST) (describing different methods of news aggregation); Posting of Emma Heald (Google News 
and Newspaper Publishers, Allies or Enemies?) to The Editors Weblog, 
http://www.editorsweblog.org/analysis/2009/03/google_news_and_newspaper_publishers_all.php 
(Mar. 11, 2009, 15:39 EST) (describing differences between fully automated Google News 
aggregator and human-edited Drudge Report); Newser: What is Newser?, 
http://www.newser.com/what-is-newser.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (stating that Newser 
combines human editorial judgment and technology); Reddit.com: Help, What is Reddit?, 
http://www.reddit.com/help/faq#Whatisreddit (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (explaining that Reddit 
relies on users to submit and rate content). 
 11. See Eric Alterman, Out of Print, NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 48, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/03/31/080331fa_fact_alterman (describing the effect of 
aggregation on news industry); AM. PRESS INST., NEWSPAPER ECONOMIC ACTION PLAN 3 (May 
2009) (“Whole swaths of the American populace have abandoned newspapers or are growing up 
without the habit of reading them, yet the Websites of news organizations attract more readers 
than ever. The problem is that the online business model does not yet come close to 
compensating for the steep slide in the print business model that it is replacing.”); Newspapers 
Face a Challenging Calculus, PEW RES. CENTER, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1133/decline-print-
newspapers-increased-online-news (describing growing reader preference for getting news online 
by following links to stories). 
 12. See Mishkin, supra note 6. 
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that aggregators wrongly piggyback on the appeal of stories written by 
the newspapers‟ employees.13 
The falling profitability of newspapers is a matter of some 
concern.  If gathering and writing news becomes unprofitable for 
newspapers, it is at least possible that more newspapers will fold, 
leaving an information-impoverished public without plentiful, reliable 
news.  Those who worry about this loss of print news, including the 
members of the newspaper industry, have suggested using copyright 
to stop news aggregators who act without the permission of the 
newspapers whose stories are used.14  This proposal is, of course, 
controversial.  Those who favor it undoubtedly see it as crucial to the 
maintenance of newsgathering and the prevention of what they 
consider as theft.15  Others, however, harbor skepticism about 
aggregation control legislation, suggesting that aggregation is actually 
good for newspapers, and that attempts to prop up an outdated 
business model are unproductive and doomed to fail.  For example, in 
a recent interview, Google CEO Eric Schmidt recognized that 
 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Richard Perez-Pena, A.P. Seeks to Rein in Sites Using its Content, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 7, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/business/media/ 
07paper.html (describing plans of The Associated Press to sue search engines and aggregators 
making use of Associated Press content); Posting of Neil Netanel (The Demise of Newspapers: 
Economics, Copyright, Free Speech) to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/05/demise-
of-newspapers-economics.html (May 5, 2008 14:47 EST) (stating that a copyright amendment to 
make sure that aggregators make payments to newspapers may be necessary to preserve 
reporting); Posting of Richard Posner (The Future of Newspapers) to The Becker-Posner Blog, 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2009/06/the_future_of_n.html (June 23, 2009, 19:37 CST) 
(“Expanding copyright law to bar online access to copyrighted materials without the copyright 
holder's consent, or to bar linking to or paraphrasing copyrighted materials without the 
copyright holder's consent, might be necessary to keep free riding on content financed by online 
newspapers from so impairing the incentive to create costly news-gathering operations that news 
services like Reuters and the Associated Press would become the only professional, 
nongovernmental sources of news and opinion.”).  
 15. See New Zealand Herald, Google Slammed as “Parasites” of the Internet, 
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/online/google-slammed-
as-parasites-of-the-internet-1664748.html (reporting statement by the Wall Street Journal 
managing editor characterizing certain news aggregators as “parasites or tech tapeworms in the 
intestines of the internet”); Mark G. Contreras, Senior Vice President/Newspapers, E.W. Scripps 
Co., Statement Before the Federal Trade Commission, Workshop: “How Will News Media 
Survive the Internet Age?” 3 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/ 
docs/contreras.PDF (stating, among other things, that newspapers need help licensing their 
content); Rupert Murdoch, Chairman & CEO, News Corp., From Town Crier to Bloggers: How 
Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age? 12-14 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/docs/murdoch.PDF (describing behavior of news 
aggregators as theft, saying that existing practices are “untenable” over the long run for the 
production of valuable news, and emphasizing that news organizations must be paid for 
producing content). 
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newspapers face significant challenges because readers use news 
aggregators.16  He asserted that Google creates revenue for 
newspapers by sending readers to newspaper websites where they will 
presumably see ads, but that it was not appropriate for Google to pay 
for content or otherwise help newspapers without a sound business 
model—something that Google has yet to identify.17 
The application of the First Amendment to aggregation control 
legislation is important because the First Amendment constrains what 
Congress can do to help the newspaper industry.  News aggregators 
speak when they tell people about interesting stories, making 
aggregation control legislation subject to First Amendment review.18  
This does not necessarily mean that such legislation is 
unconstitutional.  Copyright itself regulates speech, but courts have 
consistently upheld copyright against First Amendment challenges.19  
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has not given 
Congress the freedom to pass whatever copyright legislation it wants.  
In some cases, copyright legislation has been held unconstitutional 
even though Congress passed it for entirely legitimate reasons.20  
Accordingly, some forms of aggregation control legislation may be 
unconstitutional.  It is therefore important to identify the extent to 
which this proves true, for arguing about the desirability of legislation 
makes little sense if courts will invalidate the legislation. 
The analysis that follows shows that the aggregation control 
legislation most likely to increase newspaper profits (called 
“aggressive aggregation control”) probably violates the First 
Amendment.  This may seem surprising given copyright‟s general 
constitutionality.21  Existing copyright, however, gives newspapers 
only modest control over aggregation.22  Thus, aggregation control 
legislation will not really help newspapers unless it alters copyright to 
 
 16. Adam Lashinsky, Google News, FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/07/technology/lashinsky_google.fortune/. 
 17. Id.; see also Posting of Howard Knopf (News Aggregators as “Tapeworms”) to Excess 
Copyright, http://excesscopyright.blogspot.com/2009/05/news-aggregators-as-tapeworms.html 
(May 17, 2009, 16:23 EST) (arguing that use of copyright to control news aggregation is 
“regressive” and would only prop up an outdated business model); Posting of David Kravetz 
(Murdoch Calls Google, Yahoo Copyright Thieves—Is He Right?) to Threat Level, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/04/murdoch-says-go/ (Apr. 3, 2009, 15:00 EST) (“We 
suspect Zell and Murdoch are just blowing smoke. If they were not, perhaps they could demand 
Google and Yahoo remove their news content. The search engines would kindly oblige.”). 
 18. See infra notes 63-89 and accompanying text 
 19. Id. 
 20. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra Part I. 
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prohibit people from linking or using headlines and lead sentences 
without permission.  These changes to copyright law would mean 
converting public domain material into private property and reducing 
the scope of fair use.  Courts have already stated that such changes to 
copyright would create First Amendment problems.23  Accordingly, the 
First Amendment tells us that the expansion of copyright cannot by 
itself fully address the problems facing the newspaper industry today.  
As a result, other solutions will also have to be considered.  
The Article proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, it considers the 
extent to which existing copyright law restricts the activity of news 
aggregators.  In Part II, it describes the contents of strong aggregation 
control legislation and considers the extent to which such legislation 
would survive First Amendment scrutiny, concluding that aggressive 
aggregation control legislation would likely be found unconstitutional.  
In Part III, the Article analyzes how Congress might craft 
constitutional aggregation control legislation and whether such 
legislation is truly important to the viability of newspapers.  It 
concludes that existing copyright gives newspapers sufficient rights to 
open the door to mutually beneficial relationships with aggregators 
that may preserve the economic viability of newspapers. 
I. NEWS AGGREGATION AND COPYRIGHT 
In order to understand how expanding copyright might help 
keep the newspaper industry alive, it is necessary to first examine 
how, if at all, existing copyright limits the behavior of news 
aggregators.  Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act extends copyright 
protection to all “original works of authorship,”24 and the Supreme 
Court has held that the standard of originality is low.25  Once a work 
gains copyright, the Copyright Act grants copyright holders only six 
exclusive rights: the right to make copies, the right to make derivative 
works, the right to initially distribute copies of the work, the right to 
publicly perform the work, the right to publicly display the work, and 
(for sound recordings) the right to digitally transmit the work.26  The 
Act also limits the rights of copyright holders by denying protection to 
 
 23. See infra notes 90-141 and accompanying text. 
 24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 25. See Feist Publ‟ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that 
the standard of originality is “low” and easily satisfied); Am. Dental Ass‟n v. Delta Dental Plans 
Ass‟n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); CCC Information Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter 
Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (same). 
 26. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (2006). 
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certain aspects of otherwise copyrighted works.27  Accordingly, people 
may freely copy those portions of works that lack sufficient 
originality—such as short phrases and facts.28  The Copyright Act 
gives people a similar right to copy the ideas expressed in a work.29  In 
cases where context or other necessity renders a particular idea 
capable of only a limited range of expression, the so-called merger 
doctrine makes sure that the idea in question remains in the public 
domain by allowing others to copy even the expression of these ideas.30  
Finally, in other cases, the fair use doctrine excuses behavior that 
would otherwise be infringement.31 
Together, the rights that the Copyright Act extends give 
newspapers the ability to control some, but not all, news aggregator 
practices.  For example, a news aggregator that posts a complete copy 
of a newspaper article or a full size copy of a photograph on its website 
surely commits infringement because these uses violate the copyright 
holder‟s exclusive right to make and distribute copies of the work.  At 
the same time, however, aggregators do not necessarily infringe by 
linking or the using headlines and lead sentences. 
The copyright issues raised by linking are relatively 
straightforward.  Unauthorized linking to a copyrighted work does not 
amount to infringement because linking does not involve copying, 
distribution, or the use of any other right that the Copyright Act 
expressly grants.32  It is therefore highly unlikely that courts would 
 
 27. See id. § 102(b) (denying protection to, among other things, ideas contained in 
works).  
 28. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-62, 364 (defendant‟s use of facts and unoriginal 
compilations of facts cannot be infringement); Perma Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 
598 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (defendant‟s use of short phrases not infringement). 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (denying protection to ideas). 
 30. See ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc., 402 
F.3d 700, 707-08 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Under the merger doctrine, „when there is essentially only one 
way to express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable [i.e., they merge,] and 
copyright is no bar to copying that expression.‟” (quoting Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 856 (6th 
Cir. 2003)) (alteration in original)); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(“[E]xpression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of 
expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the 
idea itself.”); Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th Cir. 
1990) (stating that there is no copyright when idea and expression merge). 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (establishing fair use for certain uses of works, including 
some uses for purposes of news reporting); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582-
83 (1994) (defining fair use for parodic uses that do not supplant the market for copyrighted 
original); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (defining 
fair use for certain noncommercial reproduction of copyrighted works). 
 32. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (“[H]yperlinking does not itself involve a 
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hold a news aggregator liable for infringement simply for linking to a 
news article. 
The copyright issues get a bit more complicated when one 
considers the reproduction of headlines to give readers a sense of a 
news article they may want to read.  Each of the limitations 
mentioned above potentially comes into play.  Headlines may lack 
sufficient originality to support copyright.  Even if they do, the merger 
of idea and expression will sometimes prevent them from being 
copyrighted.33  Finally, the fair use doctrine will probably excuse at 
least some aggregator use of headlines.34 
As noted earlier, copyright protects “original works of 
authorship,”35 and it is easy for a work to qualify as original.36  Entire 
news articles therefore easily gain copyright, but headlines frequently 
do not because their brevity renders them unoriginal.  In fact, courts 
have a long history of denying copyright to short words and phrases.37  
For example, in Perma Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., the 
phrases “[a]long the way take time to smell the flowers” and “good 
friends are hard to find” were denied copyright for want of 
originality.38  Cases like this imply that ordinary headlines such as 
 
violation of the Copyright Act … since no copying is involved.”); see also Mark Sableman, Link 
Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1273, 1297 (2001). 
 33. Copyright clearly does not protect ideas. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). Instead, copyright 
protects only the original expression of ideas. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-104 (1880) 
(distinguishing between the ideas and concepts expressed in a book that copyright does not 
protect, and the explanation of those items that copyright does protect); Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (copyright does not protect a playwright‟s ideas, 
only the expression of those ideas). The distinction between a work‟s ideas and their expression 
is sometimes referred to as the idea/expression dichotomy. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707 (citing 
Nichols and referring to the idea/expression dichotomy). As noted earlier, in some cases, 
copyright still does not protect the expression of an idea if the idea is capable of only a limited 
number of expressions. When this happens, the idea and its expression have merged, and courts 
deny copyright protection to both the idea and its expression. See supra note 30 and 
accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 41-59 and accompanying text. 
 35. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 36. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2004) (following 
practice of denying copyright to short phrases); CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., 
Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1519 (1st Cir. 1996) (“It is axiomatic that copyright law denies protection to 
„fragmentary words and phrases.‟” (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[B], at 2-13 to 2-18 (1995))); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 
F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 1972) (denying copyright to phrase “most personal sort of deodorant”); 
Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1959) (endorsing as a 
“fair summary of the law” a Copyright Office regulation denying copyright and registration to 
short phrases) .  
 38. 598 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (E.D. Mo. 1984). 
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“Red Sox Defeat Yankees” and “Obama Nominates Sotomayor” would 
lack sufficient originality to merit copyright protection.  Perhaps 
courts would consider longer, more creative headlines like “Sox Sink 
Slowly in September” original.  Even so, the merger of idea and 
expression and the fair use doctrine would shield the behavior of at 
least some news aggregators. 
To see how the merger of idea and expression affect the 
copyrightability of even original headlines, consider the hypothetical 
headline “Sox Sink Slowly in September.”  This cleverly expresses the 
idea that the Red Sox are slowly losing ground (yet again!) in the 
American League East pennant race.  In theory, people could express 
this idea in countless ways, with each separate expression qualifying 
for its own copyright.  A person writing a headline, however, has very 
limited space in which to express herself, and there are only a limited 
number of ways to express the idea of the Sox losing the pennant race 
in five words or fewer.  If copyright allowed the monopolization of each 
of these expressions, future headline writers could easily find 
themselves in a situation where they could not express the idea 
without risking infringement.  This would mean effective ownership of 
the underlying idea, an unacceptable result given that the Copyright 
Act explicitly denies protection for ideas.39  Courts would therefore 
probably deny copyright to many headlines under the principle of 
merger.40 
The availability of fair use to excuse potentially infringing uses 
of headlines will likely depend on how courts define the market for 
news articles.  Under § 107 of the Copyright Act, fair use depends on 
four factors: (1) the nature of the defendant‟s use, (2) the amount of 
the borrowing, (3) the nature of the copyrighted work, and (4) the 
effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted original.41  The 
leading case of Kelly v. Arriba Soft42 indicates that such a four-factor 
test would shield the use of headlines to give potential readers a sense 
of the news articles to which aggregators link.  
 
 39. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 40. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the influence of automated 
search engines and news aggregation has led to the use of straightforward headlines of the sort 
less likely to support copyright. See Steve Lohr, This Boring Headline is Written for Google, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/weekinreview/09lohr.html 
(describing how search engines find stories with plain headlines more easily). 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 42. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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In Kelly, the defendant Arriba Soft operated a search engine 
that displayed so-called thumbnail images to users as search results.43  
Arriba Soft obtained those images by copying original, full-size images 
from Internet sites and producing smaller, lower quality images for 
display to users.  Users who wanted to see full-size images then had to 
click through to the original websites displaying the full-size images.  
The plaintiff Kelly sued when Arriba Soft copied thirty-five images 
from Kelly‟s website and used thumbnail versions as search results.44  
The District Court granted summary judgment for Arriba Soft, ruling 
that fair use protected its use of the thumbnail images.45  The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.46 
With respect to factor one of the fair use analysis, the court 
recognized that Arriba Soft used the copyrighted works for commercial 
purposes, and that this weighed against fair use.47  This did not mean, 
however, that factor one counted against Arriba Soft.  The court noted 
that Arriba Soft‟s use, while commercial, actually enhanced access to 
Kelly‟s images without supplanting the need for the originals.  The 
smaller, lower quality thumbnails only informed users about the 
desirability of viewing the full size original.  Users would not consider 
the thumbnails as substitutes for the originals because the low quality 
reproductions lacked too many details.  This swung factor one in 
Arriba Soft‟s favor.48 
The court then found that factor two favored Kelly because 
Kelly‟s works were creative.49  This followed well-established 
precedent holding that the use of factual works is more likely to be fair 
because facts are in the public domain and should be widely 
disseminated.50  The court also noted that Kelly had already published 
 
 43. Id. at 815. 
 44. Id. at 815-16. 
 45. Id. at 816. 
 46. Id. at 822. The court reversed the district court on the issue of whether fair use 
shielded Arriba Soft‟s use of full-sized images and remanded for further consideration on this 
issue alone. Id. 
 47. Id. at 818. 
 48. Id. at 818-20. 
 49. Id. at 820. 
 50. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (“In general, fair use is more 
likely to be found in factual works than in fictional works.”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“The law generally recognizes a greater need to 
disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”);. 
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his works, a fact that counted somewhat in the defendant‟s favor.51  
This was not enough, however, to swing factor two for Arriba Soft.52 
Factor three came out neutral despite Arriba Soft‟s copying of 
the entire images in question.53  Normally, such wholesale copying 
would resolve factor three in Kelly‟s favor.54  Here, however, the 
particular purpose of the copying justified copying the entire image 
because the images would be unrecognizable unless copied in their 
entirety.55 
The court finished its fair use analysis with the conclusion that 
factor four favored Arriba Soft.56  The opinion identified two primary 
markets for Kelly‟s photos.  These included attracting users to Kelly‟s 
website where he sold advertisements, and selling or licensing Kelly‟s 
photos for others‟ use.57  Arriba Soft‟s use of Kelly‟s images did not 
materially affect either market.  The court wrote: 
By showing the thumbnails on its results page when users entered terms related to 
Kelly‟s images, the search engine would guide users to Kelly‟s web site [sic] rather than 
away from it.  Even if users were more interested in the image itself rather than the 
information on the web page, they would still have to go to Kelly‟s site to see the full-
sized image.  The thumbnails would not be a substitute for the full-sized images because 
the thumbnails lose their clarity when enlarged.  If a user wanted to view or download a 
quality image, he or she would have to visit Kelly‟s web site.  This would hold true 
whether the thumbnails are solely in Arriba‟s database or are more widespread and 
found in other search engine databases. 
Arriba‟s use of Kelly‟s images also would not harm Kelly‟s ability to sell or license his 
full-sized images.  Arriba does not sell or license its thumbnails to other parties.  
Anyone who downloaded the thumbnails would not be successful selling full-sized 
images enlarged from the thumbnails because of the low resolution of the thumbnails.  
There would be no way to view, create, or sell a clear, full-sized image without going to 
Kelly‟s web sites.58 
In some ways, the case for shielding aggregator use of 
headlines as fair use is stronger than the case for shielding search 
 
 51. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820. 
 52. Id.; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (fair use more easily applies to uses of 
published works than unpublished ones). 
 53. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821. 
 54. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sherriff‟s Dep‟t, 447 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir. 
2006) (verbatim copy of entire work weighs against fair use); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco 
Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 925 (2d Cir. 1994) (copying of entire articles counted against finding of fair 
use). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 821-22. 
 57. Id. at 821. 
 58. Id. at 821-22. More recently, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion with 
respect to Google‟s use of thumbnails as part of its image search function. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719-25 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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engine use of thumbnails.  Aggregators use headlines in the same way 
that search engines use thumbnails—namely, to give people a sense of 
whether they would like to look at something in more detail.  
Headlines are generally factual in nature, making them particularly 
good candidates for fair use treatment.59  Additionally, headlines 
comprise only small parts of news articles, while thumbnails 
reproduce entire images.  Finally, readers are unlikely to consider 
headlines as a substitute for an entire article, making the effect on the 
market for the copyrighted original small.   
There is, however, a wrinkle.  Although readers are the obvious 
market for copyrighted news articles, one could argue that potential 
advertisers comprise the true market.  After all, newspapers sell their 
content as vehicles for attracting viewers of advertisements.  To the 
extent that publication of headlines allows news aggregators to lure 
away advertisers who would otherwise pay to advertise on newspaper 
sites, the effect on the market for the copyrighted work may be strong 
enough to warrant denial of fair use.  That said, one should be careful 
about considering such “substitution” to be determinative of fair use.  
Ordinary search engines attract advertisements by displaying search 
results that convey the substance of copyrightable web pages that 
might otherwise gain such revenue themselves.  Courts have not 
shown an inclination to treat search engines as mass infringers.60  
Thus, at the very least, it seems likely, but not certain, that courts 
would use fair use to shield at least some instances of news 
aggregation. 
The same doctrines that governed aggregator use of headlines 
also govern aggregators‟ use of lead sentences.  Here, however, courts 
likely will find lead sentences copyrightable.  Lead sentences are 
probably original because they are longer than headlines.  Courts 
would therefore be much less likely to deny copyright to lead 
sentences than to headlines because it would be hard to call lead 
sentences short phrases.  Moreover, although lead sentences often 
express ideas in a brief, focused way, the range of possible 
constructions for lead sentences is probably larger than for headlines, 
making it unlikely that a court would deny copyright because the idea 
and expression had merged.  Fair use, however, remains a distinct 
possibility.  As was the case for headlines, an aggregator‟s use of a 
 
 59. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (preliminary 
injunction against Google vacated even though the search engine made use of plaintiff‟s 
copyrighted images). 
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lead sentence is comparable to the use of a thumbnail.  The nature of 
the original copyrighted work remains factual, and the amount 
borrowed is small.  Finally, it is still quite unlikely that readers 
consider a lead sentence a full substitute for the original.  Aggregators 
will therefore find protection, if at all, under the fair use doctrine. 
II.  A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF AGGREGATION CONTROL 
LEGISLATION 
Copyright does not give newspapers reliable protection against 
every instance of aggregation.  Although in some instances 
newspapers could successfully sue aggregators for infringement, in 
others, newspapers would fail.  Accordingly, aggregation control 
legislation would help newspapers only by aggressively closing gaps in 
existing copyright law.  This would include: (1) defining newspaper 
headlines and lead sentences as copyrightable subject matter even if 
they lack originality or represent the merger of idea and expression, 
(2) curtailing the scope of fair use,61 and (3) treating links as a form of 
infringement.62  Together, these changes would effectively make news 
aggregation illegal without the consent of newspapers whose articles 
get aggregated. 
A First Amendment analysis of such legislation starts with the 
relationship between copyright and free speech.  At first inspection, 
copyright seems to conflict with the First Amendment‟s command that 
Congress shall make “no law” abridging freedom of speech.63  Courts 
generally treat the reproduction and distribution of texts as speech,64 
so the Copyright Act clearly infringes speech by preventing the 
unauthorized copying and distribution of copyrighted works.65 
 
 61. See Perez-Pena, supra note 14 (describing efforts to force aggregators to pay for 
using headlines and small amounts of text and stating that news organizations have been 
reluctant to bring copyright suits for fear of losing on grounds of fair use). 
 62. See Posner, supra note 14 (suggesting expansion of copyright “to bar linking to or 
paraphrasing copyrighted materials without the copyright holder's consent” in order to protect 
news industry). 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 64. See Neb. Press Ass‟n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (applying First Amendment to 
prevent injunction stopping press from publishing accounts of confessions to law enforcement); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (First Amendment protects publication of 
classified study “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy”). 
 65. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting authors exclusive right to reproduction and 
distribution of copyrighted works); 17 U.S.C. § 502 (providing injunctive relief against 
infringers). For articles analyzing the conflict between copyright and the First Amendment, see 
DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF 
AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009); C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 
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What, then, keeps copyright from violating the First 
Amendment?  The Supreme Court has drawn attention to two features 
of copyright to answer this question.  First, copyright acts as an 
incentive for the production of speech by permitting commercial 
exploitation of that speech.66  Second, doctrines like originality, the 
idea/expression dichotomy, and fair use guarantee many free uses of 
copyrighted works.67  This lessens copyright‟s impact on free speech, 
allowing copyright‟s pro-speech incentives to outweigh its restrictions 
on speech.  Two Supreme Court cases, Harper & Row v. The Nation 
Enterprises, Inc.68 and Eldred v. Ashcroft,69 establish this 
understanding of copyright and the First Amendment. 
In Harper, the Court considered a dispute arising from 
defendant The Nation‟s publication of an article about former 
President Gerald Ford‟s memoir A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of 
Gerald R. Ford.70  Harper & Row, the memoir‟s publisher, promoted 
the book by arranging for Time magazine to publish excerpts before 
the public could buy the book.  In the days leading up to public sale of 
A Time to Heal, The Nation‟s editor, Victor Navasky, obtained a copy 
of Ford‟s book from an unauthorized source.  This enabled The Nation 
to publish an article that summarized portions of the book and quoted 
some of Ford‟s language.  Time subsequently canceled its contract for 
early publication of excerpts.  Harper & Row then sued The Nation for 
copyright infringement.71 
 
55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Robert C. 
Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 
67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. 
REV. 983 (1970); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating 
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Melville B. Nimmer, 
Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. 
REV. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 
(1987); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of 
Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983); Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the 
First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1971); Alfred C. 
Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a 
Work’s “Total Concept and Feel”, 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, 
Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of 
Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992). 
 66. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 67. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text. 
 68. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 69. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 70. 471 U.S. at 542-43. 
 71. Id. 
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Harper is famous for applying the fair use doctrine.  For 
purposes of this Article, however, particular attention must be paid to 
The Nation‟s assertion that the First Amendment required a ruling in 
its favor.  The Nation claimed that the public‟s interest in reading a 
former president‟s exact words outweighed any copyright-based right 
to control the book‟s first publication.72  The Supreme Court rejected 
this argument and stated that doctrines like the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine ameliorated potential conflicts 
between copyright and the First Amendment.  According to the Court, 
these doctrines allowed the public to make free use of certain portions 
of works while reserving to authors sufficient rights to encourage 
speech.73  The Court wrote, “In our haste to disseminate news, it 
should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to 
be the engine of free expression.  By establishing a marketable right to 
the use of one‟s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive 
to create and disseminate ideas.”74  This economic incentive justified 
copyright‟s effects on free speech, especially when the idea/expression 
dichotomy and fair use keep copyright‟s effects on speech reasonably 
small.75 
The Supreme Court further elaborated on the relationship 
between copyright and the First Amendment in Eldred v. Ashcroft,76 a 
case that laid the framework for how courts should assess copyright 
legislation under the First Amendment.  In Eldred, the plaintiff 
challenged the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act 
(CTEA), a piece of legislation that added twenty years to the duration 
of all existing and prospective copyrights.77  The plaintiff contended 
that the CTEA was a content-neutral regulation of speech that could 
not survive the elevated scrutiny that the First Amendment 
 
 72. Id. at 555-56. 
 73. Id. at 556 (endorsing statement by Second Circuit that the idea/expression 
dichotomy “ „[strikes] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act 
by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression‟ ” (quoting 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)) (alteration in 
original)). 
 74. Id. at 558. 
 75. Id. at 560. The Court stated that, 
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's 
ditinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and 
the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no 
warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public 
figure exception to copyright. 
Id. 
 76. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 77. Id. at 192-93. 
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requires.78  The Court disagreed, however, and applied the less 
exacting rational basis test to the CTEA.79  This led to the conclusion 
that the CTEA did not violate the First Amendment.80 
Justice Ginsburg‟s majority opinion drew heavily upon Harper.  
She repeated Harper‟s observations that copyright promotes speech 
and that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use keep copyright 
from unduly restricting speech: 
In addition to spurring the creation and publication of new expression, copyright law 
contains built-in First Amendment accommodations.  First, it distinguishes between 
ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible for copyright protection. . . .  As 
we said in Harper & Row, this “idea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional 
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free 
communication of facts while still protecting an author‟s expression.” Due to this 
distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly 
available for public exploitation at the moment of publication. 
Second, the “fair use” defense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas contained 
in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances.81 
This did not mean, however, that Congress had complete freedom to 
rewrite copyright as it pleased.  To the contrary, copyright legislation 
could escape more searching First Amendment scrutiny only if 
“Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright 
protection.”82 
Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg did not define what it means 
to alter the traditional contours of copyright.  However, it seems that 
an understanding of the traditional contours ought to include long-
standing doctrines that limit the scope of copyright because those are 
the very limits that allow copyright‟s incentives to outweigh its 
restriction on speech. 
For example, consider the effect of eliminating or significantly 
weakening the idea/expression dichotomy.  Copyright leaves ideas in 
the public domain so that people may use ideas as they see fit.83  
Protecting ideas would shrink the public domain, decreasing the free 
 
 78. Id. at 193-94.  
 79. Id. at 213 (discussing rational basis for the CTEA). 
 80. Id. at 222. 
 81. Id. at 219 (citations omitted). 
 82. Id. at 221. 
 83. Id. at 219. The Court stated: 
As we said in Harper & Row, this “idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional 
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free 
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression.” Due to this 
distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly 
available for public exploitation at the moment of publication. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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use of ideas and, by extension, diminishing free speech.  This would 
upset the balance between copyright‟s incentives and restrictions on 
speech.  It is, of course, theoretically possible that any given increase 
in the scope of copyright might encourage more speech than it 
suppresses, but this does not mean that courts should merely accept 
such a possibility under a rational basis test.  As the Supreme Court 
suggested in Eldred, courts should apply elevated scrutiny to such a 
change in copyright‟s traditional contours in order to make sure that 
copyright‟s incentives still justify its restrictions on speech.84 
Brief reflection reveals further traditional contours that 
Congress should not be able to alter without exposing copyright to 
elevated scrutiny.  Weakening or eliminating fair use would restrict 
speech in ways that the Eldred Court considered important to the 
copyright/First Amendment balance.85  Additionally, extending 
copyright protection to unoriginal material would have an effect 
similar to the elimination or weakening of the idea/expression 
dichotomy.  People presently have the freedom to use unoriginal 
material in the same manner as ideas because both are in the public 
domain.86  Extending copyright protection to unoriginal material 
would therefore burden speech just as eliminating or weakening the 
idea/expression dichotomy would.87  Finally, consider what would 
happen if Congress began adding entirely new substantive rights to 
copyright.  Each of those new rights would prohibit free uses of works 
that people presently enjoy, uses that would otherwise be considered 
free speech.88 
Aggressive aggregation control legislation would therefore alter 
the traditional contours of copyright in ways that require elevated 
First Amendment scrutiny.  Making newspaper headlines and lead 
sentences copyrightable subject matter would push copyright beyond 
the boundaries that the idea/expression dichotomy and originality set.  
Prohibiting linking would be the equivalent of adding a new 
substantive right to copyright, and it would shrink the scope of fair 
use.  Given the Eldred Court‟s clear statement about the relationship 
between copyright and the First Amendment, a court could not apply 
 
 84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 85. See 537 U.S. at 219-200 (discussing the importance of fair use to copyright/First 
Amendment balance). 
 86. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Feist Publ‟ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Originality 
is a constitutional requirement.”). 
 88. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187-92 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying elevated 
scrutiny to copyright legislation removing works from the public domain). 
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the rational basis test to our hypothesized legislation without 
overlooking its responsibility to make sure that copyright‟s 
encouragement of speech outweighs its suppression of speech.89 
So what would the application of elevated scrutiny to copyright 
involve?  Two cases, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission90 and Golan v. Holder,91 offer important 
clues.  Turner involved a First Amendment challenge to the “must-
carry” provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992 that required cable television operators to 
dedicate some of their channels to the signals of conventional 
broadcast channels.92  The plaintiffs sued, complaining that forcing 
cable network operators to carry the signals of conventional 
broadcasters violated the First Amendment rights of cable network 
operators.93  The Court rejected this challenge.94 
The Court began its analysis by characterizing the must-carry 
provisions as a content-neutral, as opposed to content-based, 
regulation of speech, thereby controlling the level of scrutiny that the 
Court would apply to the statute.95  Content-based regulation 
suppresses speech because of the ideas that the speech in question 
expresses,96 whereas content-neutral regulation suppresses speech 
 
 89. Not every court has applied elevated scrutiny to copyright legislation in the wake of 
Eldred. Most notably, in Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit 
applied a deferential standard of review to aspects of the CTEA that allowed copyright holders to 
maintain their copyrights without complying with various statutory formalities. Id. at 698-700. 
The court refused to apply elevated scrutiny on the ground that the Supreme Court had already 
found the CTEA constitutional in Eldred. Id. at 700. Kahle has relatively little to say about when 
a court should apply elevated First Amendment scrutiny to copyright legislation because the 
Ninth Circuit saw the case as an attempt to re-litigate Eldred. It would therefore be incorrect to 
read Kahle as standing for the proposition that all First Amendment review of copyright 
legislation should be deferential. For contrasting analyses of this question, see David S. Olson, 
First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1393 (2009) (arguing 
that there are many situations in which courts should apply elevated First Amendment 
scrutiny); Marybeth Peters, Constitutional Challenges to Copyright Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
509 (2007) (arguing that courts are properly unwilling to use the First Amendment to invalidate 
copyright legislation). 
 90. 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
 91. 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009). 
 92. 520 U.S. at 185. 
 93. Id. at 185-86. 
 94. Id. at 185. 
 95. Id. at 189.  
 96. See United States v. Playboy Entm‟t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-12 (2000) 
(statute found content-based because it suppressed certain speech on the basis of its content); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (government may not proscribe speech 
because it disapproves of the ideas expressed); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329-30 (1988) (law 
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without reference to the ideas contained in the speech.97  Thus, a law 
prohibiting speech advocating the legalization of gay marriage would 
be content-based because it suppresses only speech expressing a 
particular point of view.  Content-neutral regulation includes laws 
prohibiting burning of draft cards and reasonable regulations 
governing the use of parks, even if those regulations prevent speech 
activities.98  Courts apply strict scrutiny to content-based regulations 
because they amount to censorship favoring some ideas over others.99  
It makes sense to find these regulations unconstitutional absent 
compelling justification from the government.  Content-neutral 
regulations, however, pose less obvious threats to speech.  Park use 
regulations do not favor some ideas over others; they merely promote 
the orderly use of public resources.  The lower threat to free speech 
associated with content-neutral regulation justifies less searching 
constitutional review.  This level of review is not cursory, but falls in 
between the deferential methods of the rational basis test and the 
practical guarantee of unconstitutionality associated with strict 
scrutiny.100  Accordingly, courts will find a content-neutral regulation 
constitutional “if it advances important governmental interests 
unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden 
substantially more speech than necessary to further those 
interests.”101 
In Turner, the important governmental interest at stake was 
the economic health of the conventional broadcast industry.102  The 
Court wrote: 
 
prohibiting display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if sign is critical or offensive 
to that foreign government is content-based regulation). 
 97. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (content-neutral 
speech regulations are justified without reference to the content of the speech). 
 98. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325 (2002) (upholding permit 
requirement for use of park); Clark v. Cmty for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984) 
(upholding restrictions on sleeping in park even though demonstrators wanted to draw attention 
to plight of the homeless by sleeping in a public park); United States v. O‟Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968) (law prohibiting burning of draft card upheld against challenge from individual burning 
draft card in protest).  
 99. See Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 813 (content-based restriction must satisfy 
strict scrutiny); Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-22 (content-based regulation subject to “most exacting” 
scrutiny). 
 100. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 548 (2001) (referring to the “often fatal 
standard of strict scrutiny”); Lyng v. Int‟l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988) (rational basis test of 
legislation is “quite deferential”). 
 101. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997). 
 102. Id. at 189-90. 
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Congress expressed clear concern that the “marked shift in market share from broadcast 
television to cable television services,” resulting from increasing market penetration by 
cable services, as well as the expanding horizontal concentration and vertical 
integration of cable operators, combined to give cable systems the incentive and ability 
to delete, reposition, or decline carriage to local broadcasters in an attempt to favor 
affiliated cable programmers.  Congress predicted that “absent the reimposition of 
[must-carry], additional local broadcast signals will be deleted, repositioned, or not 
carried,” with the end result that “the economic viability of free local broadcast 
television and its ability to originate quality local programming will be seriously 
jeopardized.”103 
Keeping conventional broadcasters healthy served three interrelated 
interests: preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air broadcasting; 
encouraging the broad distribution of information from multiple 
sources; and promoting fair competition in television programming.104  
After lengthy analysis, the Court accepted the government‟s claim 
that the must-carry rules served these purposes.105 
Next, the Court found that the must-carry provisions served 
this interest without undue burdens on speech.106  The Court 
identified two ways in which must-carry might infringe the free 
speech of cable operators.107  First, it might interfere with their 
editorial discretion in deciding what programming to carry.108  Second, 
the reduction in available channels might impair the ability of cable 
operators to compete for future carriage.109  Neither of these burdens 
proved significant.110  Cable operators satisfied the must-carry 
provisions by using unused channel capacity 87 percent of the time.111  
Very few operators had to drop programming in order satisfy must-
carry, and only 1.18 percent of cable channel capacity was directed to 
must-carry nationwide.112Indeed, cable operators voluntarily carried 
most conventional over-the-air channels.113  Although the plaintiffs 
suggested potentially less restrictive methods for achieving the 
purposes of must-carry, the Court chose not to second-guess Congress‟ 
 
 103. Id. at 191. 
 104. Id. at 189. 
 105. Id. at 190-213. 
 106. Id. at 215-16 (“Because the burden imposed by must-carry is congruent to the 
benefits it affords, we conclude must-carry is narrowly tailored to preserve a multiplicity of 
broadcast stations.”). 
 107. Id. at 214. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. (“Appellants say the burden of must-carry is great, but the evidence adduced on 
remand indicates the actual effects are modest.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 215. 
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judgment about how to regulate the cable television industry because 
of the relatively modest speech burdens imposed by the must-carry 
provisions.114 
Golan v. Holder115 involved, among other things, a First 
Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of § 514 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act,116 now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A.117  This 
provision implemented certain portions of the Berne Convention118 by 
granting copyright to certain works written by foreign authors after 
those works had fallen into the public domain.119  The plaintiffs sued 
the U.S. government to complain that § 514 deprived them of their 
right to use these works freely and without charge.120 
The District Court originally granted summary judgment to the 
Government.121  In so ruling, the District Court relied on cases—
including Eldred122—that considered copyright generally consistent 
with the First Amendment.123  The court then applied a rational basis 
test to § 514 and unsurprisingly found it constitutional.124 
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded.125  Unlike the 
District Court, the Tenth Circuit found that Congress did not 
traditionally remove material, particularly entire works, from the 
public domain.126  This meant that § 514 changed the traditional 
contours by granting copyright to certain foreign works already in the 
public domain.127  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit sent the case back to 
the District Court with instructions to review § 514 under elevated 
scrutiny.128 
 
 114. Id. at 215-16 (“Because the burden imposed by must-carry is congruent to the 
benefits it affords, we conclude must-carry is narrowly tailored.”). 
 115. 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009). 
 116. Id. at 1167. 
 117. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006). 
 118. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted Sept. 9, 
1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 119. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1168. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.; Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *17 (D. Colo. 
Apr. 20, 2005). 
 122. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 123. Gonzales, 2005 WL 914754 at *17. 
 124. Id. at *15-*18. 
 125. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 126. Id. at 1188-92. 
 127. Id. at 1192. 
 128. Id. at 1196-97. 
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On remand, the District Court applied elevated scrutiny to § 
514 and found the provision unconstitutional.129  The court first found 
that § 514 was content-neutral because the law selected speech for 
suppression simply because the speech made unauthorized use of 
certain copyrighted works, and not because of the ideas expressed.130  
The court then considered three proffered reasons for the law: (1) 
compliance with treaty obligations under the Berne Convention, (2) 
protection for the interests of U.S. authors abroad, and (3) correction 
of historical inequities.131  None proved sufficient for the statute to 
pass constitutional muster. 
The court agreed that the United States had to live up to its 
treaty obligations, but this did not obviate the need to balance the 
government‟s interest against the First Amendment rights of the 
plaintiffs.132  In this case, the restoration of copyright to works 
previously in the public domain burdened rights “near the core of the 
First Amendment.”133  Section 514 contained some minor exceptions 
that marginally decreased its burden on speech, but the court did not 
consider these to be at all significant.134  The court then noted that the 
government actually had considerable discretion about how it chose to 
implement its treaty obligations.135  For example, the government 
could have given those most affected by § 514 extended rights to make 
free use of works being removed from the public domain.136  The 
decision not to do so meant that § 514 was substantially broader than 
necessary to serve the government‟s interest.137  The remaining 
justifications fared even less well.  The court found that the 
government did not present sufficient evidence to support the 
conclusion that § 514 would actually protect the interests of U.S. 
authors abroad.138  Moreover, the court decided that § 514 actually 
created inequities rather than correcting them.139 
Turner and Golan stand on opposite sides of the line between 
permissible and impermissible content-neutral legislation.  Must-
 
 129. Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170-77 (D. Colo. 2009). 
 130. Id. at 1170. 
 131. Id. at 1172. 
 132. Id. at 1172-73. 
 133. Id. at 1173. 
 134. Id. (finding that the amount of speech subject to suppression is substantial). 
 135. Id. at 1174. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 1175. 
 138. Id.at 1175-76. 
 139. Id. at 1177. 
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carry survived intermediate First Amendment scrutiny because of its 
modest, well-targeted impact on speech, while the extension of 
copyright to public domain works failed because it deprived people of 
significant free speech rights more broadly than reasonably necessary 
to accomplish a legitimate government purpose.  The differences 
between Turner and Golan imply that Congress is not free to pass 
whatever aggregation control legislation it desires.  Turner allowed 
the government to help conventional television broadcasters at the 
expense of cable operators.  This means that the government could, at 
least in theory, act to help newspapers at the expense of news 
aggregators.  There are, however, significant differences between the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 
and aggressive aggregation control legislation, differences that push 
such legislation over to the Golan side of the line. 
First, must-carry provisions burdened speech by asking cable 
operators to disseminate the speech of others alongside their own.140  
Aggregation control operates differently because it prohibits 
aggregators from distributing their own speech, particularly 
information about news articles and where they may be read.  
Moreover, aggregation control legislation would extend copyright to 
ideas and unoriginal material, material already in the public domain.  
This resembles the propertization of public domain material that the 
Golan court found unconstitutional. 
Second, the must-carry provisions barely disturbed the speech 
of cable operators.  Cable operators rarely had to drop programming in 
order to carry conventional broadcasters‟ signals, and cable operators 
generally carried those signals voluntarily.141  By contrast, the 
suggested restriction on news aggregation greatly interferes with the 
free speech of aggregators.  It would force aggregators to drop their 
preferred programming, i.e., information about news articles, 
something aggregators would not do voluntarily. 
Third, must-carry had the primary effect of increasing the 
amount of information available to the public, while restricting news 
aggregators does not have such an effect.  The mandatory carriage of 
conventional television on cable meant that people had more ways to 
view more channels.  Using copyright to restrict news aggregators has 
precisely the opposite effect because restrictions on aggregators mean 
that the public will have fewer ways to discover, learn about, and read 
news articles. 
 
 140. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, must-carry rules survived First Amendment review in 
large part because the government limited their applicability to the 
very speakers (cable operators) whose behavior might threaten 
conventional broadcasters.142  This helped the Turner Court to 
conclude that must-carry did not burden substantially more speech 
than necessary.143  By contrast, the general propertization of headlines 
and lead sentences will affect many speakers other than the 
aggregators who might threaten the newspaper industry.  Bloggers, 
search engines, and even libraries would become liable for using web 
pages to inform readers about the general content of even a single 
news article and linking to it.  It is highly unlikely that restricting this 
sort of speech would help the newspaper industry, and indeed it would 
likely harm the overall quantity and quality of speech generally. 
The Turner and Golan holdings show that Congress does not 
have a free hand to fashion whatever aggregation control legislation it 
desires.  Using copyright to increase the rights of newspapers changes 
the traditional contours of copyright, thereby exposing aggregation 
control legislation to elevated First Amendment scrutiny.  Such 
scrutiny need not be fatal; however, the extension of copyright to 
public domain material and the weakening of fair use create serious 
burdens on speech that affect many speakers whose behavior is not 
well-connected to the goal of protecting newspapers from the effects of 
news aggregation.  Accordingly, courts should find unconstitutional 
the aggressive aggregation control legislation of the sort described 
here. 
III. COPYRIGHT AND AGGREGATION CONTROL IN LIGHT OF THE        
FIRST AMENDMENT 
The unconstitutionality of aggressive aggregation control 
provides a backdrop against which to consider the future of news 
aggregation and the revenues of newspapers.  Consider first the First 
Amendment limits on what aggregation control legislation will likely 
 
 142. Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (stating that cable television 
systems, not others, must carry local broadcast signals); id. at 209-13 (Congress had sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the expansion of cable television threatened traditional broadcasters). 
 143. See id. at 215-16 (burden of must-carry is appropriate to its benefits). The Turner 
Court did not state that the class of those burdened by must-carry provisions was narrowly 
tailored. Nevertheless, the outcome of the case probably would have been different if Congress 
had placed responsibility for carrying conventional broadcast signals on those other than cable 
operators. Doing so would have burdened the speech of many whose behavior did not injure 
conventional broadcasters with no countervailing public benefit. This would likely have tipped 
the case against the constitutionality of must-carry rules. 
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accomplish.  Aggressive aggregation control may be unconstitutional, 
but Congress could theoretically pass less restrictive forms of 
aggregation control that would survive a constitutional challenge.  For 
example, Congress might limit the parties to whom aggregation 
control would apply.  Perhaps only news aggregators (however they 
are defined) would be prevented from using headlines and linking.  Or 
perhaps Congress could restrict the duration of the prohibition against 
linking to a twenty-four-hour period after the news article in question 
is first published.  Congress might also limit the remedy for news 
aggregation.  Copyright ordinarily allows a successful plaintiff to 
recover compensatory damages or presumed statutory damages in 
addition to an injunction against the infringing activity.144  
Eliminating injunctive relief and putting a cap on the amount of 
damages would obviously shrink the effect of aggregation control on 
speech.  This could even take the form of legislatively mandated 
compulsory licensing that supports a system of micropayments from 
aggregators to newspapers.145 
Taken individually or together, these possibilities would reduce 
the conflict between aggregation control legislation and the First 
Amendment.  It is entirely possible, but not certain, that these limits 
would enable aggregation control to pass constitutional muster.  
Unfortunately, such legislation might not be worth passing because 
the suggested limits would probably still allow a significant amount of 
news aggregation to continue.  Even if news aggregators could be 
defined with sufficient clarity to avoid First Amendment vagueness 
and overbreadth problems, those identified as aggregators would 
resume aggregating after the twenty-four-hour restriction expires.  
Indeed, if aggregation were sufficiently profitable, aggregators might 
happily pay the required damages to continue aggregating before the 
expiration of restrictions.146  To be sure, limited aggregation control 
legislation would probably be of economic value to newspapers.  That 
value might not be enough, however, to keep newspapers sufficiently 
profitable.  And, of course, if Congress tries to strengthen aggregation 
control to ensure newspaper profits, the chances of unconstitutionality 
would rise. 
 
 144. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504 (2006) (providing for recovery of damages and injunctive relief 
in copyright cases). 
 145. See Netanel, supra note 14 (considering possibility that making aggregators pay for 
content is the only way to preserve reporting).  
 146. Indeed, it might be socially valuable for aggregators to do this on the theory that 
their willingness to pay reflects the social utility of aggregation. 
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The problems identified here imply that newspapers, and 
indeed society, cannot rely on legislative changes to copyright as the 
comprehensive solution for maintaining the health of the newspaper 
industry.  All is not lost, however.  Even though existing copyright law 
does not prohibit all instances of news aggregation,147 it does provide 
leverage against many aggregators because almost every aggregator 
will eventually infringe.  This leverage, along with incentives based on 
rights that newspapers clearly own, creates conditions ripe for 
commercial arrangements that benefit both newspapers and 
aggregators. 
For example, some aggregators use automated processes to 
select and display articles for aggregation.148  It is highly unlikely that 
any automated process can accurately avoid reproducing the 
admittedly unusual headline that is copyrightable or ensuring that all 
uses of lead sentences stay within fair use.  Even aggregators that use 
humans for aggregation cannot guarantee that infringement will not 
happen.  In many cases, the humans themselves are not likely to be 
well-trained in copyright law, and in still others the proper application 
will not be apparent.  Thus, simply by the law of large numbers, every 
aggregator will eventually commit infringement, thereby offering 
newspapers the opportunity to sue. 
Of course, the damages available from this kind of suit would 
be far smaller than the damages that newspapers believe aggregation 
causes, and it is not clear whether a court would enjoin a defendant 
from aggregating simply because the defendant occasionally errs.149  
Nevertheless, it is likely that enough instances of infringement could 
be lumped together to create the threat of meaningful damages, and it 
remains possible that a court would issue an injunction against 
aggregation.  In short, the suit suggested here would at least get a 
news aggregator‟s attention and trigger serious settlement 
discussions.  Neither party will want to risk the consequences of an 
adverse judgment because it could effectively destroy aggregation as a 
business or seriously damage newspapers‟ hopes for gaining revenue 
from aggregators.  This is where a newspaper can offer something to 
induce aggregators to pay fees for aggregating.   
It is important to remember that aggregators operate in a 
highly competitive market where others can easily replicate the basic 
 
 147. See supra Part I. 
 148. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 149. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (finding that injunctive 
relief should not be automatic in patent cases). 
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content that they offer.  Aggregators that want to attract and keep 
readers must therefore offer something valuable that its competitors 
cannot.  Obviously, effective choice and classification of aggregated 
articles accomplish this, as would prompt summaries of articles and 
audio-visual content that bring a website to life.  A newspaper can 
offer aggregators that settle on favorable terms the added benefit of 
these very advantages.  For example, a newspaper could offer 
immediate access to news stories before they appear on the Internet, 
allowing the aggregator to produce content earlier than its rivals.  
This could be particularly valuable in areas like financial news, where 
the ability to respond to information quickly is valued.  Similarly, a 
newspaper could offer licensing for images, videos, podcasts, or even 
entire articles that complement the news.  A newspaper might even 
offer to make its content available to aggregators in a form that made 
aggregation easier and more effective.  Again, an aggregator getting 
access to this would have a competitive advantage over rivals, and 
newspapers could cement that advantage by suing aggregators that 
use the copyrighted audio-visual content without permission. 
It is easy to see how aggregators might find it attractive to pay 
some amount (perhaps a reasonable percentage of advertising 
revenue) in exchange for these benefits and the freedom to aggregate 
without fear of suit.  Indeed, a truly enlightened aggregator should 
realize that some support for the news industry is a good idea because, 
without news gathering, there is nothing to aggregate.  It is likely that 
such arrangements have already begun.  In 2006, Agence France-
Presse (AFP) sued Google, contending that Google‟s news aggregation 
infringed AFP‟s copyrights.  Google settled that case on terms that 
“will enable the use of AFP‟s newswire content in innovative, new 
ways that will dramatically improve newswire content on the 
Internet.”150  Google also entered into a similar arrangement with the 
Associated Press, as did Yahoo.151  More recently, the Associated Press 
 
 150. Caroline McCarthy, Agence France-Presse, Google Settle Copyright Dispute, CNET 
NEWS, Apr. 6, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/Agence-France-Presse,-Google-settle-copyright-
dispute/2100-1030_3-6174008.html.  
 151. Juan Carlos Perez, Google Inks Deal to Run Associated Press Content, INFOWORLD, 
Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.infoworld.com/t/data-management/google-inks-deal-run-associated-
press-content-768 (licensing deal with Associated Press gives Google “permission to use the wire 
service's material in a broader manner than it currently does”); Posting of Rocky Agrawal (How 
the AP Blew It) to reDesign, http://blog.agrawals.org/2009/04/15/how-the-ap-blew-it/ (April 15, 
2009 21:17 EST) (referring to Yahoo! as an early licensee of AP). 
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has conducted intense negotiations with Google and Yahoo for new, 
and presumably more comprehensive, agreements of this nature.152 
Without question, the expense of filing a suit and conducting 
negotiations might prevent agreements between all newspapers and 
all aggregators, but newspapers could probably negotiate successfully 
with the major aggregators if they really cared to do so.  This leaves 
open the possibility, if not the likelihood, that the absence of 
aggregation control legislation will not stop society from enjoying the 
benefits of news aggregation while preserving the economic viability of 
newspapers or other news gathering organizations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered a preliminary analysis of aggressive 
aggregation control and the First Amendment.  For better or worse, a 
significant portion of the commentary about aggregation control calls 
for such legislation without considering the issues raised here.  This is 
unfortunate because aggregation control imposes serious burdens on 
free speech that courts cannot ignore by repeating the conventional 
refrain that copyright is consistent with the First Amendment.  
Indeed, it is quite likely that the First Amendment significantly 
reduces the usefulness of aggregation control legislation to ensure the 
health of newspapers.  Fortunately, as this Article has shown, 
newspapers and newsgathering will not necessarily disappear.  
Existing copyright can, without violating the First Amendment, still 
provide sufficient leverage for newspapers to negotiate arrangements 
to share the revenue generated by news aggregators.  Of course, this 
does not mean that newspapers will be as profitable as they once were 
or that newsgathering will remain as large a business as it is today.  
There is, however, considerable reason to believe that mutually 
beneficial agreements between newspapers and aggregators will help 
keep newsgathering a vital part of our society. 
 
 
 152. See Russell Adams, AP, Yahoo Near Deal on Content Use, WALL STREET J., Jan. 14, 
2010, at B2. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Associated Press‟ negotiation with Google has turned 
contentious, with Google having voluntarily decided to stop carrying Associated Press content. 
See Dirk Smillie, AP’s Curley Has Fightin’ Words for Google, FORBES, Apr. 30, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/30/associated-press-google-business-media-apee.html (describing 
content of earlier Google arrangement with Associated Press and issues in ongoing negotiations); 
Posting of Mike Masnick (Google Stops Hosting AP News) to Techdirt, 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100111/0744197702.shtml (Jan. 11, 2010 16:51 EST). 
